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A.

OF FACTS

PRELI~fiNARY STATE~IENT

The parties will be referred to as in the Court below.
All italics are ours.
Plaintiff deems it advisable to make a complete and
comprehensive statement of facts in order that the Court
may be fully advised with respect to all issues presented
by appellant's brief.
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The event resulting in the injuries to plaintiff OCcurred while he was engaged in the performance of his
duties as a brakeman at Milford, Utah, at about the
hour of 4 :45 o'clock p.m. on the 29th day of January,
1947.
His action was filed in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, where the matter was tried before a jury. The jury's verdict, dated
October 5, 1948, is as follows (R. 21):
''We the Jurors impaneled in the above case,
find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant and assess plaintiff's damages as
follows:
Total Damages ----------------------------$12,500.00
Diminution by reason of contributory negligence, if any ____ 3,500.00
Amount of Verdict given --------$ 9,000.00"
The defendant's Motion for New 'Trial was denied
on the 5th day of N ovemher, 1948.
In his complaint, plaintiff charged defendant with
negleet in failing to furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe
place to work, in that it maintained the low ground
switch connecting the crossover with No. 1 Track at
Milford, Utah in a dangerous and unsafe condition, by
allowing sand, gravel and debris to accumulate and become packed around the rod connecting the switch S't.and
with the switch points so that the switch could not be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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manipulated without extren1e, unnatural and unusual
physical exertion.
Plaintiff also charged defendant with failing to furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work in that it
allowed drainage water to accumulate around said switch
stand and around the switch rod connecting the stand
with the tracks so that in cold and freezing weather water
would and did freeze around the switch rod rendering
it unusually difficult for a person to throw the switch.
Plaintiff also charged defendant with neglect generally in keeping and maintaining the switch in a dangerous and unsafe condition in that it so kept and maintained the switch that it could not be thrown without
unusual, unnatural and extreme physical exertion.
Defendant admitted that it was engaged as a common carrier by rail in interstate commerce at the time of
plaintiff's injury and that plaintiff was engaged in the
performance of his duties at the time and place of his
injury, but denied the other allegations of the complaint.
Upon admitted facts the remedy afforded plaintiff
is controlled by the provisions of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A., Section 51, providing, in so
far as material here, as follows:
''Every common carrier by railroad while
engaged in commerce between any of 'the several
states or territories shall be liable in damages to
any person suffering injury while. he is employed
by such carrier in such commerce * * * for such
injury resulting in whole or in part * * * by reaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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son of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its * * * appliances, track, roadbed
* * * or other equipment.''
There was no material conflict in the testimony. The
evidence conclusively demonS'trated that plaintiff was
injured in the course of his employment and that he was
injured as a result of the dang·erous and unsafe condition
of the switch.
Under the evidence the negligence of defendant became a question for the jury and the jury, upon proper
instructions, found defendant negligent as charged.
Defendant, in its brief, has conceded that its negligence was and became a question for the jury in the
following language (p. 6):

'' * * * Since we do not intend upon this
appeal to question the sufficiency of plaintiff's
evidence to justify submission of this case to a
jury, there is no purpose to be served by detailing any further the difficulties which Duffy encountered in throwing the switch nor his evidence
as to its difficulty of operation."
Defendant assigns as error refusal of the court
to grant its motion for a new trial, contending ·that the
verdict was excessive and returned under the influence
of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury, and that
certain other errors were committed by the court in its
instructions to the jury.
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B. THE FACTS
Charles Thomas Duffy, the plaintiff, at the time of
his injuries, was 63 years of age. He had been working
for the Union Pacific Railroad Company for approximately 28 years, during most of which time he had been
employed as a brakeman. At the time of his injuries he
was working as the rear brakeman, traveling from Caliente, Xevada to Salt Lake City, Utah, on Train No.
44, which was a mail and express train (R. 92). This
train necessarily had to travel through the railroad
company's yards at :\Iilford, Utah. The main line track,
upon which the train was traveling, was a single track
and at :\Iilford, Utah the railroad company maintained
a yard in which a track, known as No.1 Track, ran generally parallel with the main line and immediately south
thereof. :Jiovements were made from the main line track
to track No. 1 by way of Crossover Track at the west
end of the yard (R. 95, 96, 98).

a

On plaintiff's return trip frmn

Caliente, Ne-

vada to Salt Lake City, Utah, on January 29th, 1947,
his train proceeded through Milford in a general easterly
direction. As the 'train approached Milford his crew received information that they were to meet another train
in that vicinity, and that the other train was superior,
so that it became necessary for plaintiff and the memhers of his crew to move Train No. 44 from the main line
track onto No. 1 Track. When the train arrived at a
point where the crossover connected the main line track
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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with No. 1 'Track they slowed down and the head brakeman changed the switch connecting 'the main line track
with the crossover, proceeded to the switch connecting
the crossover to No. 1 Track, and the train passed
through the crossover. It then and there became plaintiff's duty ·to change the erossover switches back to their
normal positions after the rear of the train had passed
onto No. 1 Track. He dropped off the caboose, changed
the switch connecting the crossover with the main line
track and thereafter approached and was in the process
of changing the switch connecting the crossover track
and No. 1 'Track when he suffered and sustained the
injuries complained of.
The crossover switches involved herein are low
ground throw switches. They are operated by a lever
approximately the length of a yardstick. These are two
of the most important switches in the yard and are used
several times during the course of every days work (R.
141, 143). Plaintiff had no difficulty in handling the outside crossover switch connecting the main line with the
crossover on this occasion. He· testified (R. 96):

'' Q.

And did you handle this outside crossover
switch at that time~

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

Did you have any difficulty handling that
switch~

A.

No sir."
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
He then approached the inside crossover switch, unlocked
and raised the handle and tried to throw 'the switch with
both hands. He could not get it above an upright position
with the nse of his two hands. He then placed his right
hand on the switch and his left on the lamp post at the
s"-i tc h stand in order to get more leverage and pushed
outward with both hands. It was at that point that he felt
a severe sharp pain in the pit of his stomach (R. 126131).
On the 20th day of September, 1946, approximately
four months before the accident, plaintiff had been operated on for removal of a gall bladder. He had been hospitalized for a number of days and had been released
for work on the 18th day of November, 1946. He had
worked continuously from the 20th day of November,
1946, up to and including the 29th day of January, 1947,
the date that he was injured. During that time he had
experienced no trouble in performing the duties of his
employment; had thrown many switches without any
difficulty whatsoever (R. 108).
Following the accident plaintiff continued with his
train to Salt Lake City and reported to Dr. Rees Anderson who discovered an incisional hernia in the area of
the previous operation (R. 125, 126). He continued to
work, wearing a support, until the 28th day of February,
1947 (R. 131). On the 3rd day of March, 1947, he entered a Salt Lake hospital and on the 4th day of March,
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1947, was operated on for correction of the incisional .
hernia (R. 136, 137). He sustained a loss of wages as
a result of the accident in the amount of $1,300.00 (R.
132, 133).
MANNER IN WHICH PLAINTIFF MANIPULATED SWITCH

Plaintiff described the manner in which he manipulated the switch as follows:
''A. * * * Then I got down and unlocked this
switch, H is a lock switch, this. I raised it up; I
got it up to here, and I got it over to there with
both hands and I couldn't get it no farther. You
see, there is a lamp here on the top of this switch
and after I got this thing over to here I couldn't
get it no farther. I turned my hand on that lever,
like that, and I put my hand against the lamp to
get more leverage and then I felt this pain.
Q. All right. Now you can take the stand
again, Mr. Duffy. Had you experienced any difficulty in handling the switch from the main line
on to the crossover 1

A.

No, sir.

Q.

How had you done that job1

A. That job worked all right. The job was
relined. All I had to do was reline that switch
back to the main track.
Q.

How did you do that 1

A. It worked all right. By the same motion
as I did the other switch. (R. 109)

* * * *
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~-\. The switrh "·as in this position. I pulled
it up to here, then took both hands and shoved it
to here; couldn't shove (R. 116) it any farther, I
turned Iny hand- * * * on the lever, like this, and
put n1y hand against the lamp, or top of the
switrh, then I shoved that way when I got it back.

Q.

Just as you shoved-

A.. T es, just as I stretched out, put the
weight on here, and braced against the lamp, it
was kind of slippery under foot, ice and mud, then
I pushed it on down and locked it." (R. 117)

The testimony fully revealed that plaintiff complied
with the customary and usual procedure in handling this
type of switch.
Defendant's witness, George Alexander Connell,
testified that the natural way to throw a switch was by
use of the hands, and that the manner in which the hands
were used on the switch depended upon the individual
(R. 247). He also testified that the safest way of handling the switch was by use of the hands rather than the
feet. He also testified that it is customary and usual
for switchmen to throw a switch which is difficult to manipulate by using every possible means of leverage that
is convenient for the individual using the switch (R.
252).
Mr. Alvey Robinson, another of defendant's witnesses, also testified that the normal way in which to
throw a switch is by use of the hands and that it. is safer
to ·throw a switch by use of the hands (R. 269, 270). He
also testifed that the normal, usual and customary manSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
ner of throwing a switch is to use every effort that can
be used to bring the switch points together and to obtain
the best leverage possible in order to do so, and that it
would be customary and usual for a switchman, charged
with the responsibility of closing the switch, to use all of
the effort and strength at his command, if necessary, in
order to accomplish the operation of changing the switch
(R. 265, 266).
It will be noted that the plaintiff's train had
proceeded on some distance to the depot leaving him
alone with the switch, and that he was required to change
the switch before walking the considerable distance to the
depot and mounting his train. The blocks would not
clear until the switch had been changed.
CONDITION OF THE SWITCH

That the switch involved in this action was negligently maintained was abundantly proven by the evidence.
The switch was a low ground type. Extending from
the switch stand to the switch points was a block signal
connecting rod. When the switch is thrown the connecting rod rotates in a rotary motion. Also connecting the
switch stand with the switch points, running along hetween the switch ties, is the main switch rod which is the
mechanism that actually changes the switch points (R.
101, 102 -Exs. "D" and "E"). The ground underneath the switch rod and bridle rod that connects with
the lever which throws the switch, at the time of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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accident. came up to the level of the switch rod and
bridle rod and was icy and half frozen. There was water
in the area of the rod. When the lever was pulled H
would pull the rod through the frozen ground. (R. 117,
118). There was a knuckle on the end of the rod and
when the switch was thrown this knuckle would have to
rotate down through the frozen mud and ice. The knuckle
extended into the mud and ice probably three-quarters
of an inch (R.11s;119, 144, 145).
There was a general slope in the area of the tracks
and the natural drainage of water was down into the
low ground switches involved herein (R. 120, 121). The
slope extended from the roundhouse track toward the
switch where plaintiff was injured (R. 121, 122-Ex.
"B").
There was no drainage whatsoever away from the
switch and the water which might accumulate around
the switch would either have to soak into the ground or
be bailed out. In the winter when there was a thaw it
was customary to bail the water out from around the
switch (R. 122, 123). In addition, engines which were
required to stand on the roundhouse track, after being
watered at the water tank (Ex. "A"), would exhaust
five or six gallons of water which would spill over and
run down into the switch where plaintiff was injured
(R. 122).
In manipulating a low ground switch it is more difficult to move the switch after it reaches a vertical position than before because at that time the switch points
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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are coming up against the rail and making the contact
(R. 147).
When a train or heavy equipment would go over the
crossover and switch points involved there would be
some up and down movement which caused mud,
ice and water to ooze upward and around the switch
points (R. 150). Mud, water and ice also accumulated
around the top of the tie-plates where the switch
points traveled back and forth, and sand dropping down
from the sanders of heavy equipment passing over
the switch points mixed in with the mud and ice making
a sort of hard paste rendered the switch much more
difficult to throw (R. 151). At the time when the accident occurred the weather was freezing and the mud
around the switch involved was half frozen and mixed
with ice (R. 152).
Throwing the switch from its normal position to the
position allowing trains to pass from the crossover
onto No. 1 'Track was easier than throwing the switch
back to its other position (R. 155).
Switchmen, other than the plaintiff himself, who
were well acquainted with the crossover switches, and
in particular the one where paintiff was injured, supported his testimony in regard to the condition of the
switches. Jack C. Mahoney, an engine foreman, with
many years of experience in the Milford yards, testified
that during freezing weather in l\iilford both of the main
line switches, referred to in 'the evidence, would run full
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of water and freeze and would at various times be filled
up with sand due to the starting of locomotives out of
the No. 1 Track ( R. 159) ; that this would cause the
switch to ''throw harder'' and if too much sand got into
the switch it would require cleaning and oiling (R. 160).
He also testified that during the month of January there
had been numerous occasions when it was necessary to
call out the section gang in order to throw the switch
when it would freeze up, and that on occasions it was
necessary for the night shift to leave the mov-ement of
cars for the day shift because of the impossibility of
operating the switch, it being necessary for the section
gang to dig out the switch (R. 161).
This witness further testified to the inadequacy of
drainage when he related the necessity of calling out
bucket brigades to remove the water which accumulated around these switches whenever there was a thaw.
(R. 164, 165).
Harold Wilford Renshaw, an experienced switchman, well acquainted with the Milford yards and the
switch involved in this case, testified that during the
month of January, 1947 he had experienced difficulty in
manipulating both of these main line switches (R. 197).
He related that about January lOth he noticed that as
the train went over the switches the mud and water kept
slushing up and down, the ties sinking about 3 or 4
inches. He further stated that on this occasion he attempted to throw the switch here involved and because
of the difficulty he experienced it was necessary for them
to stop the train. After three or four tries he was finally
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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able to lock the switch. On another occasion, around
the 15th or 18th of January, he worked on this switch
for ten minutes. Because of the delay the engineer
came over to the switch and also attempted to throw
it but he also was unable to lock the switch. It was
then necessary for them to back up the train and forego
the use of this switch because of their inability to manipulate it (R. 198-200).
David Leonard Muir, a switchman of 25 years experience with the Union Pacific Railroad Company
who had worked at Milford for many years, testified that
the overflow from the wa:ter tank and injectors on the
engine caused water to accumulate at the switch here
involved. This water would freeze up and cause the
body locks of the switch to freeze solidly. He also testified that engines and trains moving over these switches
would cause the ice to break up and that small
chunks of ice would get into the switches and make them
hard to throw (R. 220-222). He also described the condition caused by sand getting in between the switch
points and slide rods and making the switch hard to
throw ( R. 222-224) ..
Byron Pulham testified that on occasions he found
it impossible to throw the switch and as a result
he would be unable to do the work until he could
contact the section foreman to clean out the switch and
make it useable ( R. 228, 229).
Even Alvey Robinson and William Riley Hunter
were unable to controvert the great weight of the 'testiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mony of plaintiff's witnesses regarding the condition of
the switch (R. 267, 268, 292, 293).
COMPARISON WITH OTHER SWITCHES

The switch involved in this case was exceptionally
difficult to manipulate and handle in comparison with
other switches of its type and kind used by the defendant
company at .Milford and elsewhere. Plaintiff testified:

"Q. You have had occasion to observe other
s·witches of this kind, you've stated, before~
A. Yes.
Q.

And over a long period of

A.

Yes.

time~

Q. Now, from your observation of other
switches, both in the Milford yard, and other
places where you have observed them, what can
you say with respect to the ordinary and usual
and customary condition of those switches- and
I have reference to the space between the dirt and
the rods which you have shown us in the photograph~

A. Well, many other switches is all the way
from two to three inch clearance below those rods
for drainage.
Q. And what effect does that have on the
operation of the switches, as you have observed
them~

A.

That clearance, is that what you

Q.

Yes.

mean~
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A. Clearance makes them throw more freely.
(R. 119)

• * * •
Q. Now, Mr. Duffy compared with other low
ground switches which you ordinarily and customarily use and rnani pulate on your run, how
does this-how does this switch, generally, as you
observed it on the various occasions when you
have (R. 152) manipulated it, compare-

h~

til

ar

• * * *
ill

Q. How does it compare in regard to the
ease or difficulty in the use of switches~

A.

m

It works hard.

* * * *
A.

th

I say, it works extra hard.'' (R. 153)

Harold Wilford Renshaw drew a remarkable comparison of this switch with other switches of the same
type and kind regarding comparative ease and difficulty
of operation.

"Q. Mr. Renshaw, in your experience in Milford in handling the various ground switches in
Milford and in other places, how did the operability or the ease or difficulty in the operation
of this inside cross-over switch compare with
other switches of similar type in l\iilford and in
other places where you were working in January,
1947~
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A. "'\Yell, that switch there has always been
hard for me to throw at any time in the winter
time.

Q. And

why~

A. In the summer time, when ties are warm
and it is clean they have got plenty of oil on it,
guy can throw it without any effort; but, in the
winter time when that mud and ice or water, I
mean, slushes up and down, and as these cars go
over it, you know, you have seen ties sink that
when weight goes over them, water splash up and
mud will seem ·to get in and that rod slides across
there, where usually most switches got about that
much-

* * * *
A. Well, there is no clearance in there for
water and that, to drain off, like most switches.
There is about five or six inches clearance there,
that rod that guides (R. 201) that switch point.

Q.

On this switch, is it

different~

A. Yes-well, that one is different, and the
main line switches and i)lat, they are all kept
cleaned out and clear of everything. If any water
in them, ·they drain off. 'That one spot, there is
always water there, even in the summer time.
(R. 202)

* * * *
Q. Now, I think you stated ·that in the summer time when there was oil in the switch, that
it was easy enough for you to throw~
A. Yes, without any hardQ.

to

When the weather was cool, it was hard

throw~
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A.

That's right.

Q. That is generally true with all low
ground switches, isn't it~
A.

Not necessarily.

Q. Well, doesn't the oil getting cold in 'the
switch make H harder to throw~

A. Well, not oil, not if it is oiled good, water
won't stick on oil, I don't believe." (R. 204)
Byron Pulham also noted a remarkable difference
between this switch and the other low ground type
switches used by the defendant railroad company in
other places.

'' Q. All right. Tell us how that switch usually works as compared with other low ground
type switches~
A. Well, that switch, its pretty low, and in
the wintertime I have trouble with it because it is
frozen up quite often. You can't throw it. It
seems to be low enough, that is if the snow melts
or an engine standing there with an injector the
water runs in there and it gets on the cross bar
and freezes the points and you can't throw the
switch." (R. 227)
CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF INJURY

Charles Thomas Duffy, the plaintiff, testified in
relation to his injuries as follows:
''A. Well, I had a sharp pain in my stomach
and burning sensation which felt like warm water
running over my stomach, a stinging sensation.
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Q. And at that time when you felt that pain
just where were you in the process of handling
this switch!
A. That "~as when I just put the switch
down, the switch lever down. It lasted probably
seYen or eight minutes and it kind of left. (R. 113)

Q. And during that period, from the time
you left 1Iilford until the time you arrived at
Salt Lake, will you describe your physical condition to the jury~
A. During the time we left l\filford I went
in and sat down and I talked to the conductor
about it and he said, 'Do you think you hurt
yourself?' I said, 'I've got an awful sharp pain
there.' (R. 114)

A. Well, after throwing this switch, I had
severe pain right in the pit of my stomach here,
and, as I said before, felt like there was some
water running, out, maybe I had broken open.
After I had went on the train, went in the
dressing room, opened up my shirt, looked, it was
all right, only red, little bit red.

* * * *
A. Night when I got home I still had the
pain, but the area red was larger.

Q. Were you able to sleep that

night~

A. Not very well; I rolled around quite a
bit, quite painful; felt stiff like.
Q.

Did you do anything for the

pain~
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A. No, I couldn't. I didn't get in Salt Lake
City until sometime around seven-thirty.
Q. Now, after you saw the doctor, or at the
time you, saw the doctor, did he recommend any
treatment for you, or any future medical care~

A. No ; I asked him, and he told me he would
have to have-to perform an operation on there,
and do that job over again, that I had torn it
loose inside.' ' ( R. 126)
* * * *

Until the second operation was performed plaintiff
wore a heavy canvas belt.
''A. Strapped around me underneath, then
pulled up tight. He said hold it together; hold it
to keep from tearing any more, if I happened to
get up, I got a hard pop, or something.
Q. Stand up and just point on your body to
it; just point to the place where that incision is-

A.

Incision is right in here, through here.

Q.

( Continued)-to the jury, so the jury can

A.
ches.

Right in through here, probably ten in-

Q.

About how long would you say that is?

see.

A. About ten inches.

Q.

About ten

A.

About, I should say.

Q.

Run

A.

Yes, straight up and down. (R. 127)

inches~

vertical~
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Q. Is that the incision that was made when
gall bladder operation was performed~
A.

Same one.

Q. And~\.

Same length.

Q. Where with respect to that incision was
it that this pain occurred~
A.

It was in the upper part, about that far

Q.

The upper part of the incision?

A.

Yes.

up.

Q. N" ow, you stated that you went to the
hospital for an operation~
A.

Yes.

Q. And from the time that you saw the doctor until you went to the hospital for the operation what can you say about the presence or absence of pain~
A. \Yell, I had pain now and then! more of a
trial, you know, sometimes get a sharp pain.

Q.

Could you stoop

down~

A. If I stooped down I seemed like something was moving up, like that.

Q.
sleep¥

How about evenings, and your ability to

A. I slept fairly well about a week afterward. (R. 128)

Q. Were you conscious or unconscious when
the operation was performed~
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A. Well, I was conscious when he started,
but I don't remember it. I remember them s·tarting to cut, just feel like something scraping. (R.

129)
* * * *
A. Well, I couldn't see-they wouldn't let
me raise my head up to see. They had some rubber
sort of thing over my head, and held my head
down. I couldn't raise up to see, but I could fee~
then, when they started to cut, but not for long.
Q.

How long were you on the operating

a
ft

table~

A. I believe it was an hour and forty-five
minutes.

Q. Now, after the operation had been performed, you remained in the hospital for some
time, did you not~

A. Yes.
days~

Q.

About how many

A.

Well, about fourteen days.

Q. And was there any treatment given to
you during that fourteen days of your hospitalization~

A. Well, the first five or six days there I had
several hypodermics, and morphine tablets at
night.
Q. Were you able to sleep at night~ (R. 129)
A. When I got them; I couldn't sleep otherwise.
Q. And what can you say with respect to
the presence or absence of pain during that fourteen days~
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.A. 'Yell, there was quite a burning, sharp,
shooting pain all the time.
·

Q. Did yon return directly home after theafter your hospitalization period Y
~\..

Yes, I went right hon1e.

Q. Ann, after you were home, were you able
to get up and about, or not.
~\.. X o ; when I came home, I came home in
a cab. Went to bed as soon as I got home, didn't
feel like sitting up.

Q. How long were you in bed?
A. Oh, I was in bed five or six hours, then
I would get up, sit down a while, then go back to
bed again, get dizzy like when I would get up.
Q. After you were at home, and during this
period, what can you say about the pain?

A. Pain? Yes, I had pain when I came home.
but I had some pills, morphine tablets they would
give me in the hospital, when I left.'' (R. 130)
Dr. Rees H. Anderson described the first operation
for removal of the gall bladder as follows :

'' Q. Then, when that incision was made, I
assume that the stomach is taken out¥
A. Stomach is retracted to the side of exposed gall bladder area, and then, by proper surgical procedure, it was-your removal was effected. This included dissections and proper ligation of the blood vessels, and other parts of the
anatomy, which is a technical procedure, and that
was carried out.
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Q. I see. Now, in order that you could get
into the stomach and 'retracted,' as you indicate,
and then remove the gall bladder, what ·tissue or
flesh or muscles were necessary for you to cut
through to make this incision you have described¥
(R. 176)

ar

A. Like to make this clear; I will try to
avoid the technical language; the abdomen is,
roughly, composed of several layers of tissue.
There is the skin, then a layer of fat, ·then a layer
of muscle, which is covered by what we call fascia,
fascia, a hard, dense tissue under which is what
we call the peritoneal lining, very soft or flexible
tissues.

r]f

Q. That fascia is what is termed as the real
support, isn't it¥
A. That is correct; these various layers
were all cut through to open in the stomach by the
abdominal cavity.

Q. Now, after the operation I assume you
sewed up these-the coverings, including the fascia that you have described, after the operation 1
A. That is correct. I might explain exactly,
in detail, what was done. In ·effect, the various
layers were sewed together, or approximated,
with suture material, with possibly one exception
at the lower angle of the wound, where a rubber
tube drain was brought out through this part of
the layers of the abdomen. This was a technical
procedure which was considered necessary in this
particular case.
Q. Is it always necessary to place a drain in
the wound after a gall bladder operation¥
A. No sir, there are many cases that no
drain whatsoever is used.
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Q. The drain. I assuine, delays the healing,
or at least the-yes, the healing of the fascia,
and other layers of the skin and muscle1 (R. 177)

A. Yes sir, the drain necessarily delays the
healing of all the layers.
Q. How long was the drain left in the plaintiff, Duffy!

A. Ordinarily three to four to five days,
depending on the circumstances or the condition
for which it was placed.
Q. I see. Now, I think you said in this case
these-the fascia and these other coverings were
not overlapped but just sutured together1

A.
mary.

Approximated; that is usually custo-

* * * *
together~

Q.

And you sewed them

A.

\Yith suture material, yes sir." (R. 178)

The doctor testified regarding plaintiff's medical
treatment following his injury as follows:
'' Q. You say January 31st. At that time, did
you examine the area where you had performed
this incision 1

A.

That is correct.

Q.

What did you find 1

A. He had a protruding mass into the scar,
in the lower end of the scar, which, on proper
examination, indicated to me that it was what
we term an 'incisional hernia.' ( R. 180)
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Q. 'Incisional hernia', what do you mean
by that¥
A. That is a hernia-many types of hernias,
and the lay terminology, a hernia is a rupture.
Many types-four or five types of hernia-an incisional hernia one occurs through a previously
operated wound or incision.

al

\\'I

Q. Now, had you ever observed on him any
evidence of any hernia before this¥
A.

No sir.

Q. He talked to you about his injury, I take
it¥

A.

Yes. (R. 181)
:jj:

•

* *

Q. When you operated him, what did you
find~

A. I found that these various layers of
tissue, which we have described before, several
layers, some of them had healed properly in their
normal position, and the main fascia layer had
not healed, but it had spread apart and become
separated. This allowed the soft tissue to bulge
forward, and that was, in effect, what is the condition he had.
Q. Now, will you describe to the jury this
incisional hernia; what part of his body protruded through this opening, where the incision
previous had been made~

A. I couldn't say for sure, but, from its
location, I would assume that it was the stomach
and the viscera in the upper part of the abdomen,
the intestines, possibly the colon, which protruded
through this defect, largely the stomach. (R. 181)
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Q. Largely the stomach that protruded
through that area where the incisi-on was originally n1ade for the operation for gall bladder~
A. It would protrude at times; it wasn't always out there, butQ. But it was serious enough you felt it
should be operated~
A.. Yes.
Q. ~-\nd then, of course, that is why you
operated?
~-\.. That's right. (R. 182)

* * * *
Q. Do you know what usually causes

hernia~

A. I would say the cause of hernias is a
combination of many factors. (R. 182)

* * * *
Now, I will ask you if you have an opinion as to whether or not a strain would have a
tendency to push the stomach through that weakened portion of the stomach wall~
A. That's correct.
Q. I assume you have performed numerous
operations such as a gall bladder operation, and
as the operation for incisional hernia~
A. Yes sir, I have. If you may permit, recently qualified to be one of the American College of Surgeons, which requires a great number
of these similar types of cases.
Q. And, would you say, from your experience, that this type of operation is a serious
Q.

operation~

A.

Yes. (R. 183)

* * * *
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Q. Can you give me some idea, if you know,
is there a certain percentage of cases where it
recurs or where you get a hernia from an operation of this kind, subsequently~

A. My best judgment, experience, would
indicate somewhere between five and ten per cent,
I don't know exactly; you would have to study
a series of cases.

Q. And-but you think maybe five or ten
per cent there is a hernia, an incisional hernia,
following such an operation~
A.

Yes sir. (R. 186)

* * * *
Q. And do you remember why it wasn't
done then, and delayed until March~

A. I don't know the exact reason. I think
that, that perhaps we decided to temporize with
the belt, or something of that sort until he was/ don't think that he was particularly prepared
to undergo ·another operation, mentally, at that
pa.r1t~cular time. (R. 188)

p:

rJI

~
l:
fl]

* * * *

a!

w

Q. Then you operated on him on March 4th
or 5th, some place~

A.

5th.

Q.

And was that operation

successful~

A. To the best of my knowledge, up to the
time I last examined him.
Q. And he was in the hospital some thirteen
days, I think, after that operation~
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~-\..

I believe that is correct.

Q. ~-\nd then, did you see him after he got
out of the hospital: did you see him in the following weeks~
~-\..

On seYeral occasions, yes.

Q.

~-\.bout

how often would you see him 1

A. I think first, possibly every week; little
later, every two weeks.

Q. And did he make some complaint of pain,
to you, at that time when he came to see you~
(R. 189)
A. I will have to refer to the record. Yes,
he did complain of pain.

Q. And to what would you attribute his
pain after, at that time~
A. I felt that the pain that he complained
of was probably due to the fact that we had actually sutured the fascia in an imbricated or underlying fascia, this is bringing it together in a tight
or unnatural condition. This was a safeguard to
allow us two or three rows of suture material
when repaired. I .attribute to the, that technical
·procedu.r'e for the operation, the subsequent pain.
(R. 190)
,.. * * *
Q. Doctor, you mentioned five to ten per
cent of the cases of incisional hernia where a
drain is used-I mean you mentioned that there
are about five or ten per cent of the cases where
there is an incisional hernia where a tube has
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been used, which occur, in the ordinary course of
events; that is what you meant, isn't it~ (R. 191)
A.

That's right. (R. 192)

* * * *
Q. Now, the question I had in mind-and
this is my last one-the second operation, instead
of just bringing these walls together, the fascia
and other walls together, you overlapped them
and sewed them, didn't you~
A.

Tha:t is correct.

Q.

Why~

A. In any hern~a, the tende·ncy to recur is
co"YtSiderable. This man developed a hernia from
his incision. We wanted to safeguard any future
development of hernia at this site, and that was
the reason we imbricated over or overlapped the
fascia, to give us at least two or three lines of
suturing so that it would be, I guess, 're-enforced', you might call it, if you were sewing up
your pants. (R. 193, 194)
Q. What, in your
recurrence in his case?

~opinion,

might cause a

A. I believe the poor tissue, the poor fascia,
the improper hea.Bing. (R. 194)

* * * *
A. We used what we call interrupted sutures. It isn't a continuous stitch; it is an in·terrupted suture, so that each one is tied and
cut separately, and there would be at least, an
estimate would be several dozen, possibly fifty
or more." -(R. 194)
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ARGU~fENT

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT INSTRUCT THE JURY
THAT DEFENDANT \YAS AN INSURER OF THE SAFETY
OF ITS EMPLOYEES.

POINT II.
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 WAS NOT HYPOTHETICAL IN
NATURE AND ACCURATELY STATED THE LAW OF THE
CASE.
POINT III.
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 IS A CORRECT STATEMENT
OF THE LAW.
POINT IV.
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 IS A CORRE'CT AND ACCURATE
STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND DID NOT PREJUDICE
DEFENDANT IN ANY MANNER WHATSOEVER.
POINT V.
THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS NOT SO EXCESSIVE AS
TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS DICTATED BY PASSION
OR PREJUDICE.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

~I

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT INSTRUCT THE JURY

kl

THAT DEFENDANT WAS AN INSURER OF THE SAFETY

of

OF ITS EMPLOYEES.

ilihe:

Defendant complains of Instruction No. 3 and contends that said instruction constituted reversible error.
It is a well known principle of law that the charge
to the jury should be considered as a whole. In 3 Am.
Jur. Sec. 1097 the rule is stated:

1M!enaenl

l~!orth

l~n:

''The charge to the jury should be considered
as a whole by the appellate court, with a view
to ascertaining, if possible, whether the rights
of the complaining party were so prejudiced as to
prevent a fair trial. If when so considered the
charge presents the law fairly and correctly to
the jury, there is no ground for reversing the
judgrnen t, though some of the expressions, when
standing alone, might be regarded as erroneous."
Instruction No. 3 reads in parts as follows:
''The statute upon which this action is based
is the Federal Employers Liability Act and said
Act provides every common carrier by railroad
while engaging in commerce between any of the
several states shall be liable in damages to any
person suffering injury while he is employed by
such carrier in such commerce, arnd for such injury resultmg in whole ~or in p.art from the negliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

m
r]r

T

33
gence of any of the empDoyees of su,eh carrier ion
its app~iances, machinery, o.r othe·r equipment.
The fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty
of contributory negligence under this act is not
a bar to recovery but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to the plaintiff.''

Other instructions bearing on the duty owed by
defendent to its employees and given by the court are
set forth herein. Instruction No. 4 reads in part as follows:
"You are inst,..-,wted that the defend(]Jftt is WO't
an insure;r .of the safety of the plaintiff or any
of its employees. The mere fact that plaintiff was
injured while in the performance of his duties
does not, standing alone, entitle him to recover.
The rplaintiff in .order to reaover must prove b,y
a preponderarnce of the evidence that the defendant was negligent as charged in the complaint
and that such negligence was a proximate cause
of his injuries, if any.''

* * * *
''Negligence on the part of anyone is not to
be inferred from the fact that an accident may
have occurred. The happening of an accident, if
any, and the resulting injury to the plaintiff, if
any, are not evidence of negligence on the part
of the defendant, nor evidence of contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Accidents
may happen without any negligence existing on
the part of either party. Negligence, if any, and
contributory negligence, if any, must be proved
by
a preponderance of the evidence in this case.''
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Again in Instruction No. 7 the Court states that:
'' 'Negligence' is the failure to do what a reasonably prudent person would ordinarily have
done under the circumstances of the situation,
or doing what such person under such existing
circumstances would not have done. The essence
of the fault may lie in acting or omitting to act.
The duty is dictated and measured by the exigencies of the occasion.''

\'I

P\

* * * *
Instruction No. 9 reads in part as follows :
''In an action for personal injuries under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, caused in
whole or im part by negligence :of the carrier, the
injured person is entitled to recover full compensation for all damages pnoximately resultfing f'nom
such neglig·ence, even though such injuries may
have been aggravated by reason of his pre-exiSf.
ing physical condition, or might not even have
occurred had it not been for such previously
existing physical condition.''
* * * *

lnil

In

Instruction No. 10 reads in part as follows:

'' * * * but it is sufficient to allow recovery in
favor of plaintiff if the negligence, if ~arvy, of
t:he defendant proximately eraused, in whole or
in rpa.rt, a strain which resulted in an incisional
hernia suffered by the plaintiff.''
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Instruction No. 12 reads in part as follows:
''Before yon can find in favor of the plaintiff
you must be satisfied, by a preponderance of the
evidence, * * *
( 1) That the defendant failed to use ordinary
care in keeping the inside cross-switch
clean and free from congestion;

* * * *
( 3) That an employer of ordinary intelligence and prudence could have foreseen
that injury to a person throwing said
switch might likely follow from defendant's failure, if any, to use ordinary care
* * ... "
Instruction No. 13 reads in part as follows :
''The Court charges you that if you believe
from the evidence that the injuries sustained by
the plaintiff happened to him by a mere accident,
without negligence on the part of the defendant,
* * * then your verdict must be in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff, 'no cause of
action.' ''
In their arguments to the jury there was no intimation by counsel for either side that plaintiff could recover except on the basis of established negligence on
the part of the defendant.
The Court committed a grammatical error by inserting the word ''and'' in Instruction No. 3, and yet,
in 'the light of the instructions as a whole, and Instruction
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No. 3 in particular, it is inconceivable that the jury could
have been misled into believing that plaintiff could prevail without proving negligence on the part of the defendent.
Prejudice from giving of an instruction will never
be presumed, but on the contrary it is the responsibility
of the complaining party to demonstrate that prejudice
resulted from said instruction. Stat.e v. McCarty ·et al.,
104 Kan. 301, 179 P. 309.
Defendant boldly states that the jury was told that
defendant was an insurer of the safety of its employees
while on duty and yet, at defendant's request, the Court
specifically and clearly in Instruction No. 4 stated that
defendant is not an insurer of the safety of plaintiff or
any of its employees, and that plaintiff, in order to
recover, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that defendant was negligent as charged in the complaint.
POINT II.
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 WAS NOT HYPOTHETICAL IN
NATURE AND ACCURATELY STATED THE LAW OF THE
CASE.

Instruction No. 9 is herein set forth for the convenience of the Court :
''In an action for personal injuries under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, caused in
whole or in part by negligence of the carrier, the
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injured person is entitled to recover full compensation for all damages proximately resulting from
such negligence, even though such injuries may
have been aggravated by reason of his pre-existing physical condition, or n1ight not even have
occurred had it not been for such previously
existing physical condition.
You are instructed ·that if you shall find and
believe from a preponderance of the evidence that
plaintiff in operating and attempting to operate
and use the inside cross-over switch at Milford,
Utah, did so in the usual, ordinary and customary
manner, then you will not be warranted in finding
him guilty of contributory negligence in this regard, even though you shall find and believe that
at the tim€ the plaintiff operated and attempted
to operate and use this switch there was at ·that
time a muscular weakness in his abdomen, due
to the operation which he had undergone previously for the r€moval of the gall bladder.''
Defendant contends that there was no evidence of a
usual, ordinary and customary method and manner of
manipulating the switch and that Instruction No. 9
is therefore erroneous in that, while it may state the
law accurately, it is hypothetical in nature and not based
on the evidence.
The evidence fully revealed that the ordinary, usual
and customary manner of manipulating the switch was
by use of the hands and by use of whatever force and
leverage could be brought to bear, depending on the individual manipulating the switch. \Vhether plaintiff conformed with the usual and customary manner of manipulating the switch by shoving with one hand on the
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handle of the switch and the other on the switch stand
was a question which was properly presented to the
jury for its consideration.
The instruction, which the court gave, accurately
stated the law of the case. :Defendant has stated in its
brief that the manner in which plaintiff threw the switch
was unusual. This was a question which was presented
for the jury to determine. The plaintiff testified that
the manner of his manipulating the switch was in no
way a departure from the usual, ordinary and customary manner of manipulating switches, and witnesses
Alvey Robinson and George Alexander Connell supported that testimony at R. 247, 252, 265, 266, 269 and
270.
There was no evidence that plaintiff operated the
switch in an unusual or negligent manner, and the burden of proving contributory negligence was on the defendant. Having failed entirely to prove contributory
negligence, how can defendant complain about error in
submitting that issue to the jury~
The question arises as to what prejudice, if any,
defendant could have suffered as a result of Instruction
No. 9. Defendant contends that the question of contributory negligence was improperly submitted to the jury
and yet the jury determined that plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence and deducted $3,500.00 from the
general verdict for such contributory negligence. Therefore, regardless of any possible error that may be contained in the instruction defendant could not have
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been prejudiced in any 1nanner, shape or form whatsoever.
In Thomps·on v. City of Bellingham, 112 Wash. 583,
192 P. 952, 955, the court stated:
''The last assignment complains of an instruction upon the subject of contributory negligence, predicated upon conditions the appellant
contends do not exist in the case. It is unnecessary to decide, among other reasons, because, if
there was error, it was harmless, for the jury by
its verdict was with the appellant in this respect.''
In nl orris r. Bloomgren, 127 Ohio St. 147, 187 N.E.
2, 89 A.L.R. 831, 837, the court stated:

"The plaintiff below cannot complain of prejudicial error in the refusal to get special charge
No. 4, because he secured a verdict.''
In D'T"Ury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 58 S.W. (2d) 969,
88 A.L.R. 917, 939, the court sta:ted:

''These criticisms of the instructions are not
matters of which the plaintiffs can complain. If
they were errors, they were not prejudicial to the
plaintiffs. The verdicts cured them. The jury
found that the defendant was negligent, and the
ins{ructions criticized by the plaintiffs could not
have affected that finding.''
See also Thompson v. Town of Ft. Bnanch, (Ind.) 178
N.E. 440, and 0'1~lall;y v. Eagan et. ·al.. , (Wyo.) 2 P. (2d)
1063.
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POINT III.
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 IS A CORRECT STATEMENT
OF THE LAW.

Instruction No. 11 is set forth herein for the convenience of the court :
''It was the duty of the defendant railroad
company to keep this switch in such working condition that an injury would not be likely to result from overexertion, to any employee throwing said switch.
"You are instructed that the plaintiff has
not even alleged and does not claim that the defendant was negligent in permitting the plaintiff
to return to work after the operation undergone
by the plaintiff in connection with his gall bladder; you are, therefore, instructed that you may
not find the defendant guilty of negligence in permitting the plaintiff to return to work on the date
when he resumed his employment with the defendant after such operation for his gall bladder.
You are, therefore, specifically instructed that
you may not return a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant for damages
for the plaintiff's alleged incisional hernia based
upon the fact that the defendant railroad company permitted the plaintiff to return to work
after he had undergone said gall bladder operation.''
Defendant contends that the first paragraph of the
instruction places upon the railroad company an absolute duty to make the switch safe for any employee
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required to manipulate said switch. It will be observed
that the court in said instruction places upon defendant
the duty only of keeping the switch in such working
condition that an injury would not likely result from
overexertion to any employee throwing it. A proper
synonyn1 for the word "likely" is "probable". This
language connotes foreseeability, that it was probable
and foreseeable that an employee while manipulating
said switch would overexert and thereby injure himself.
We submit that if the railroad company kept its switch
in such condition that it was likely or probable or foreseeable that any employee while throwing the switch
would injure himself by overexertion, that such conduct
on the part of the railroad company would constitute
negligence as a matter of law. Defendant's contention
that the instruction places upon the railroad company
''an absolute mandate that such appliances must be
kept safe" is erroneous as not taking into consideration
the true meaning of the word "likely" as it is used in
said instruction.
In Stewart v. Baltimore & 0. R. Oo., 137 Fed. (2d)
527 ( Cer. den. ) ________, the following fact situation appeared: Plaintiff's intestate was employed by defendant as a hostler's helper. On the evening of October 30,
1941 he suffered a coronary thrombosis which had resulted from straining himself while attempting to throw
a switch in the defendant's railroad yard. He died as a
result of the coronary thrombosis. It was contended by
defendant that the switch was not defective but only
hard to move because it was new and stiff and that thereSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fore defendant was not guilty of negligence in furnishing
for use of its employees the switch upon which decedent
injured himself. From an order of the trial court granting defendant's motion for nonsuit, plaintiff appealed
and the Second Circuit Court of A·ppeals, consisting of
Justices L. Hand, Augustus N. Hand and Chase, Justice
Chase dissenting, reversed in the following language:
''The defendant seeks to juS'tify the dismissal
of the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the
switch was not really defective but only hard to
move because new and stiff. But it should be observed that the decedent threw three other
switches without difficulty on the very evening
he strained himself with the switch in question
and that Edman did not need to use a bar in order
to throw any of ·the other switches. There is no
proof that the defendant had tested the switch
after it was installed or had done anything to
prevent its being used by an employee without
undue exertion. In our opinion it was for the
jury to say whether oper:a~ion of the switch in
question was so likely to result in injury from
over-exertion that a vrudent emplo·yer would not
hav.e supplied it to his workJnen, but wot~rld .rather
haV:e fur.nished a more easily turned appliance.
There have been many decisions which have held
that it is negligent to require a workman to move
articles that are too heavy for him to lift without
help. Albertz v. Bache, G. T., First Dept., 57 Hun
592, 10 N.Y.S. 639; Bowman v. Kansas City Electric Light Co., Mo. App., 213 S.W. 161; Stewart
Dry Goods Co. v. Boone, 175 Ky. 271, 194 S.W.
103; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Langan, 116 Ky. 318,
76 S.W. 32; Culver v. Union Pac. R. Co., 112
Neb. 441, 444, 445, 199 N.W. 794; Hice v. Garrett,
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Tex. CiY. App. 194 K,Y. 667; Bonn v. Galveston
& S . ..:-\. R. Co., ~rex. CiY. App., 82 S.W. 808; Boyd
v. Great Northern R. Co., 8-± ~Iont. 84, 27-± P. 293.
It is true that in these cases recovery sometimes
failed because of proved knowledge by the employee of the danger and involuntary assumption
of the risk but, by the amendment of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act in 1939, as amended
by 53 Stat. 140±, Title 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 54, 'the
doctrine of assumption of risk was obliterated'
as a defense to negligence on the part of the
carrier and there was left 'for practical purposes
only the question of whether the carrier was
negligent and whether that negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury.' Tiller v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. S. 54, 58, 66, 63 S. Ct.
4-U, -1±6, 87 L. Ed .................. The decision of the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals, in Hines v. Ross, 230
S. W. 1066, relied on by the defendant, really
turned on the question of assumption of risk and
hence has no pertinency in view of the amendment of 1939. The same thing may be said of
the decision in Jirmasek v. Great Northern R. Co.,
151 Minn. 421, 186 N. W. 814.
''Doubtless an employee cannot recover damages for every harm he may suffer through failure of his employer to provide him with the best
sort of appliance unless the situation is such that
the chance of injury can be reasonably foreseen.
But where, as here, the likelihood of injury from
the operation of a switch that was hard to turn
cannot be said to have been beyond a reasonable
apprehension the question whether the employer
maintained a proper standard of care was for
the jury. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318
U. S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed .................. Overexertion resulting in serious casualties is something which can as well be foreseen as many other
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occurrences and is something which an employer
may be thought bound to take all reasonable steps
to prevent.''
It will be observed that the court in its opinion uses
the exact language of the trial court in this case. '' * * *
so likely to result in injuny from overexertion * * *"
The court, in Instruction No. 11, did not endeavor
to set forth the requirements of proof before plaintiff
could recover but merely related the duty which was
owed, in connection with another subject, to wit: that
defendant was not negligent in permitting plaintiff to
return to work too soon after the operation for removal
of his gall bladder.
Instruction No. 12, which follows immediately thereafter, sets forth the requirements of proof before plaintiff can recover in the following language:
"Before you can find in favor of the plaintiff
you must be satisfied, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that each and all of the following propositions are true:
(1) That the defendant failed to use ordinary care in keeping the inside crossswitch clean and free from congestion;
(2) That plaintiff's incisional hernia was a
natural and probable result of the failure if any, on the part of the defendant
to keep said switch uncongested;
(3) That an employer of ordinary intelligence and prudence could have foreseen
that injury to a person throwing said
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switch might likely follow from defendant's failure, if any, to use ordinary care
in respect to keeping the said switch free
from congestion.''
It will be observed the jury is clearly instructed
that before plaintiff can recover it must appear by a
preponderance of the evidence that defendant tailed to
use ord ina ry care in keeping the switch clean and free
from congestion, and further required that defendant,
as an ordinary prudent employer, oould have foreseen
that injury might likely result from its negligence in the .
manner of keepi;ng the switch. It is clear from the instruction set forth that defendant's contention "that
Instruction No. 11 informs the jury that the railroad
company has an absolute duty to make the switch safe"
is absolutely contrary to the instructions which the court
actually gave, contrary to the court's decision in the
Stewart case.

Blair v. Baltimo,re & 0. R. Oo., 323 U.S. 600, 65 S. Ct.
545, 548. In this case the plaintiff incurred an injury
while engaged in unloading a freight car containing
30 foot steel tubes, weighing approximately 1,000 pounds,
by using a 5-foot nose truck about 2 feet high. The
evidence revealed that the tube slipped and plaintiff's
helpers released their holds; that the truck kicked back
against the plaintiff and thereby caused the injuries complained of. The court clearly held that plaintiff had no
duty to cease work rather than assume the burden of
lifting a heavy object with inadequate tools and insufficient help. The court stated:
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''"" * • We cannot say as a matter of law that the
railroad complied with its duties in a reasonablv
careful manner under the circumstances her~
nor that the conduct which the jury might have'
found to be negligent did not contribute to petitioner's injury 'in whole or in part.' Consequently . we think the jury, and not the court
should finally determine these issues.
'''The court below, however, thought that the
plaintiff should not recover because he had assumed the risk of this danger. It is to be noted
that at the time this case was tried Congress had
passed an act which completely abolished the
defense of assumption of risk. 53 Stat. 1404, 45
U.S.C.A. Sec. 54. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast LineR.
Co., supra. We need not consider whether this
statute applies to this case, since we are of opinion that it cannot be held as a matter of law
that the petitioner assumed the risks incident to
moving the steel tubes.''
The second contention made by defendant in attacking the portion of the instruction herein set forth is,
' 'all that is required is that the switch be placed in such
condition as would be reasonably safe for an employee
using the same with reason.able oare for his own s:afety.''
This contention fails to take into account the situation
where a switch is kept in such an unsafe condition that
any employee using it would likely be injured by overexertion, and that an employee using such a negligently
kept switch was himself negligent in the way in which
he manipulated the switch. Of course, under such circumstances contributory negligence of an employee could
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tute a complete and absolute bar to recovery. Defendant
is endeavoring by this argument to revive and revitalize
the now defunct defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk. Contributory negligence was abolished as a defense under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in the year 1908, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 53. Its bedfellow, assumption of risk, was abolished in all of its
aspects in the year 1939, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 54. The intention of Congress in abolishing these defenses is clear.
Comparative negligence has replaced common law principles in this important field of law.
In G.rand Trwnk Western Railway Co. v. Lindsay,
233 U.S. 42, 34 S. Ct. 581, 583, it appeared that the plaintiff, who was a switchman, had gone between two cars
where the couplers had failed to couple on impact after
several attempts had been made; that he gave a ''go
ahead" signal before going between the cars and that
his arm was crushed when the cars came together by
virtue of the impact.
Among the errors assigned in the intermediate appellate court was the refusal of the trial court to give an
instruction relating to the action of the switchman in
entering between the cars and his supposed giving of the
"come ahead" signal. This instruction, while leaving
to the jury the determination of whether the switchman
in going between the cars to examine the coupler mechanism gave a ''come ahead'' signal, nevertheless asked the
court to instruct as a matter of law that if he had done
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so his act was the proximate cause of his injuries and
therefore he could not recover.
The court discussed contributory negligence as a
possible bar to recovery, and supported the trial court
in refusing the requested instruction in the following
language:

"* * * But having regard to the state of the proof
as to the defect in the coupling mechanism, its
failure to automatically work by impact after
several efforts to bring about that result, all of
which preceded the act of the switchman in going
between the cars, in the view most favorable to the
railroad, the case was one of concurring negligence ; that is, was one where the injury complained of was caused both by the failure of the
railway company to comply with the safety appliance act and by the contributing negligence of the
switchman in going between the cars. Under this
condition of things it is manifest that the charge
of the court was greatly more favorable to the
defendant company than was authorized by the
statute for the following reasons: Although by
the 3rd section of the employers' liability act a
recovery is not prevented in a case of contributory negligence, since the statute substitutes for
it a system of comparative negligence, whereby
the damages are to be diminished in the proportion which his negligence bears to the combined
negligence of himself and the carrier,-in other
words, the carrier is to be exonerated from a proportional part of the damages corresponding to
the amount of negligence attributable to the employee (Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U. S.
114, 122, 57 L. Ed. 1096, 1101, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep.
654) ,-nevertheless, under the tenns of a proviso
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to the section, contributory negligence on the part
of the employee does not operate even to diminish the recovery where the injury has been occasioned in part by the failure of the carrier to
comply "ith the exactions of an act of Congress
enacted to promote the safety of employees. In
that contingency the statute abolishes the defense of contributory negligence, not only as a
bar to recovery, but for all purposes."
In TliUer L Atlantic Coast Line R. Oo., 318 U. S. 54,
63 S. Ct. ill, 87 L. Ed. 610, 323 U.S. 574, 65 S. Ct. 421,
89 L. Ed. 465, Justice Black, speaking for the court,
stated:
''If this were not sufficiently clear from the
language of the amendment, any doubt would be
dissipated by its legislative history. The 1939
bill was introduced by Senator Neely and was
supported at the hearings by the railway labor
unions. It was accepted both by the unions and
the railroads that the bill would utterly and completely abolish the defense of assumption of risk.
The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee
struck at the basic reasons advanced by common
law courts for the existence of the doctrine, declared it unsuited to present day activities, and
described them as out of harmony with the equitable principles which should govern determinations of employer-employee responsibilities. The
bill, as described in the report, was clearly aimed
at making the principles of comparative negligence the guiding rules of decision in accident
cases: ''The adoption of this proposed amendment will, in cases in which no recovery is now
allowed, establish the principle of comparative
negligence,
which
theby the
jury
weigh
the Services
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fault of the injured employee and compare it
with the negligence of the employer, and in the
light of the comparison, do justice to ~ll concerned.'''

* * * *
''No case is to be witheld from a jury on any
theory of assumption of risk and questions of
negligence should under proper charge from the
court be submitted to the jury for their determination. l\1:any years ago this Court said of
the problems of negligence, 'We see no reason,
so long as the jury system is the law of the land,
and the jury is made the tribunal to decide disputed questions of fact, why it should not decide
such questions as these as well as others.' Jones
v. Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co., 128 U. S. 443, 445,
32 L. Ed. 478, 479. Or as we have put it on
another occasion, 'Where the facts are in dispute, and the evidence in relation to them is that
from which fair-minded men may draw different
inferences,' the case should go to the jury.''
Since the Lindsay case the Supreme Court of the
United States has consistently supported and upheld
the doctrine of comparative negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and since the 1939 amendment both contributory negligence and assumption of
risk in all of their various aspects and under whatever
name applied, he it sole proximate cause or non-negligence, has been denied recognition.

Garay, Ancillary Admr. ,of the Esbat·e of William
Frank Lucus, Dec'd v. 8outhern Bac. Co. Decided Jan.
3, 1949, 17 L. W. 4089, 4090, 335 U. S. --------· In this case
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decedent's death occurred when a one-man flat-top motorcar crashed into the back end of an 82-car freight train
on a main line track at a point near Lamay, Utah. The
train had stopped on the main line as a result of a
Safety Appliance Act violation. It was successfully
contended in the trial court and in the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah by defendant that the unexpected
stopping of the train as a result of the Safety Appliance
Act violation was not a proximate cause of decedent's
death; that decedent's contributory negligence was the
sole proximate cause of his own death. The Supreme
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, stated:
''The language selected by Congress to fix
liability in cases of this kind is simple and direct.
Consideration of its meaning by the introduction
of dialectical subtleties can serve no useful interpretative purpose. The statute declares that railroads shall be responsible for their employees'
deaths 'resulting in whole or in part' from defective appliances such as were here maintained.
-!5 U.S.C. 51. And to make its purpose crystal
clear, Congress has also provided that 'no such
employee ... shall be held to have been guilty of
contributory negligence in any case' where a
violation of the Safety Appliance Act, such as
the one here, 'contributed to the . . . death of
such employee.' 45 U.S.C. 53. Congress has thus
for its own reasons imposed extraordinary safety
obligations upon railroads and has commanded
that if a breach of these obligations contributes in
part to an employee's death, the railroad must
pay damages. These air-brakes were defective;
for this reason alone the train suddenly and unexpectedly stopped; a motor track car following
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at about the same rate of speed and operated
by an employee looking in another direction
crashed in to the train; all of these circumstances
were inseparably related to one another in time
and space. The jury could have found that decedent's death resulted from any or all of the
foregoing circumstances.''
In the case of Clyde VVlilkerson v. Wilson McCarl!hy

et

~al,

decided Jan. 31, 1949, 17 L. W. 4175, 4178, (not yet

reported), a railroad switchman was injured when he
slipped on a narrow boardwalk across a wheel-pit. The
defendant endeavored again to revive the defense of
contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery,
again arguing that the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries was his own neglect in choosing to walk
~s the boardwalk when another and safer means was

available to him. The United States Supreme Court
stated:
"There was, as the state court pointed out,
evidence to show that petitioner could have taken
a slightly longer route and walked around the pit,
thus avoiding the use of the board. This fact,
however, under the terms of the Federal Employers Liability Act, would not completely immunize the respondents from liability if the injury was 'in part' the result of respondents' negligence. For while petitioner's failure to use a
safer method of crossing might be found by the
jury to be contributory negligence, the Act provides that 'contributory negligence shall not bar
a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished
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by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee .... ' ''
In the case at bar defendant is endeavoring to revive contributory negligence as a defense by associating

two entirely separate and distinct problems into one.
"\Yhat the defendant here seeks to do is to require
that plaintiff be free of contributory negligence before
there can be a finding of negligence on the part of defendant. In other words, under this contention contributory
negligence would again be a complete defense to an
action under the F.E.L.A. In the Tille.r case defendant
sought to have assumption of risk by plaintiff play a
part in the determination of whether or not the defendant was negligent and the court rejected such contention in no uncertain terms. In the I/imdsay, Oo11ay and
WilkerSion cases defendant asked that the defense of con-

tributory negligence be resurrected under the name of
proximate cause and this was also summarily rejected.
We submit that the defendant's contention in the case
at bar should be rejected as an attempt to engraft upon
the F.E.L.A. the defense of contributory negligence 1n
direct violation of the clear terms of the Act.
Defendant is again endeavoring by introduction of
''dialectical subtleties'' to confuse a proper interpretation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act which provides for apportionment of negligence among the acting
parties.
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POINT IV.
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 IS A CORRECT AND ACCURATE
STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND DID NOT PREJUDICE
DEFENDANT IN ANY MANNER WHATSOEVER.

Instruction No. 16 is challenged by the defendant
in regard to those portions which read as follows:

'' * * * In determining the amount of such
damages, you are instructed that plaintiff is entitled to compensation for ·all pain and suffering,
if any, both mental and physical, which he has endured since the time he sustained his injuries and
that he will prob1ably endure in the futur·e; in determining con1pensation for pain and suffering,
if any, yon may take into consideration its duration and its severity. The law furnishes no way
by which to measure what is reasonable compensation for mental and physical pain and suffering, but it is left to the sound judgment and discretion of the jury trying the case to determine
from a preponderence of the evidence what is
reasonable compensation to compensate the plaintiff for any physical or mental pain and suffering
he has endur:ed or will probably endure in the
futur:e.
You are further instructed that you may
take into consideration loss of bodily function,
if any, which !Plaintiff has suffe.red or which plaintiff will probably suffer in the future."
There are two questions which must be decided in
analyzing the foregoing instruction. 'The first is, whether
or not the instruction is a correct statement of the law.
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The seeond is, whether the instruction, assuming it to
be a correct statement of the law, in any way prejudiced
the defendant under the evidence of this case.
(a) Instruction No. 16 is a correct and accurate
statement of the law.
Defendant apparently takes issue with the rule
of law as set forth in Instruction No. 16 when he
cites such cases as Jensen v. Omaha & Council Bluffs
St. Ry. Co., 257 X. \Y. 257 and Missouri Pac. Tramsportation Co. r. Kinney, 135 S. \V. (2d) 56. These cases apparently adopt the narrow and restricted viewpoint that
there is a substantial difference between ''reasonable
certainly" and "probable". We assume defendant cites
these cases with the view in mind of prevailing on this
court to overrule and abrogate the principles set forth
by this court in Picino v. Utah-Apex Mining Oo., 52 Utah
338, 173 P. 900, and by the United States Supreme Court
in interpreting the Federal Employers' Liability Act
in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Carnahan, 241 U. S. 241,
36 S. Ct. 594, 595. It is beyond dispute that this court is
bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court where the Federal Employers' Liability Act is
involved. See Sullivan v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 258
N. W. 38. In the Carnahan case the following instruCtion was challenged :

·..

'}

'' 'The court instructs the jury that if they
believe from a preponde11ance of the ·evidence
that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff in this
action, then in assessing damages against the
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defendant, they may take into consideration the
pain and suffering of the plaintiff, his mental
anguish, the bodily injury sustained by him his
pecuniary loss, his loss of power and capacit; for
work and its effect upon his future, not however
in excess of $35,000, as to them may seem just and
fair.' ( .... Va ..... , 84 S.E. 863.)"
Defendant contested the instruction on the ground
that it allowed the jury to speculate on future pain and
suffering that was remote, and contended that only such
future damages could be recovered as were reasonably
certain. The Supreme Court of the United States discussed the lower court's dicision and in supporting the
instruction, stated:
''The supreme court expressed the view that
the speculation of future results which the railway company professed to apprehend was not
left by the instruction for the jury to indulge, nor
did the instruction commit the amount of damages
to the conjecture of the jury independently of the
evidence in the case. The contention made here
was explicitely rejected, viz., that the instruction
pern1itted the jury to tal:ce into consideration the
'possible future physical effects from the injury,
such as future suffering in the absence of evidence as to the probability of such.' The court
remarked that it would be a strained construction
of the language of the instruction 'to hold that it
referred to future suffering, and that damages
not the proximate result of the injuries received
were included under' it, and that, besides, such
conclusion was precluded by an instruction given
at the request of the railway company, which was
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'that in order for the plain~i.ff to recover in this
case he must pro~' e by a pre po nde.r.anc.e of the
eride-nce that the injut·ies he sustained were the
di.rect and pron~ma.te rest~lt of the neglig-ence of
the aefen:dant. ,•

''The con1n1ent of the court is accurate and
we can add nothing to it. The principle is established that when the evidence in a case shows
that there will be future effects from an injury,
an instruction 1clz ich justifies ·an ifnclus von of them
in an a.u·ard of damages is not error. Washington
& G. R. Co. v. Harmon (Washington & G. R. Co.
v. Tobriner), 147 U.S. 571, 37 L. Ed. 284, 13 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 557; McDermott v. Severe, 202 U. S.
600, 50 L. Ed. 1162, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709.
1

"It is also objected that the instruction 'allowed the jury to indulge in speculation and conjecture; invited their attention to the sum of
$35,000, and allowed the jury to give such sum
as damages as to them might 'seem just and fair'
without stating that the damages could be only
such as were proved by the evidence to have
proximately resulted from the negligent act complained of.''
''The objection is untenable. As we have seen,
the court explicitely enjoined upon the jury that
there must be .a proximate 0/Y/}d caus;al relation
between the damages and the negligence of the
company, and the reference to the sum of $35,000
was a limitation of the amount stated in the declaration. There could have been no misunderstanding of the purpose of the instruction. Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U. S. 114, 119,
58 L. Ed. 1096, 1100, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654, Ann.
Cas. 1914C, 172."
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It will be observed that the United States Supreme
Court found that the jury need only find future pain
and suffering, if any, from a "preponderance of the
evidence'' and expressly renounces any requirement of
reasonable certainty in determining damages for future
pain and suffering.
In the Picilno case this court, speaking through Judge
Thurman, considered the following instruction:
" 'If, under the 'evidence and the instructions
given you by the court, your verdict is in favor of
the plaintiff, you will assess his damages, and in
doing so you have the right and should take into
consideration his age and his earning capacity,
before and after the injury, the nature and extent
of his injury, and whether permanent or not, the
physical pain and mental anguish suffered and
endured and that he will probably hereafter endure by reason and on account of said injury, the
time lost and that he will probably hereafter lose,
as n1ay appear from the evidence, by reason of
and as a direct result of such injury, such expense, if any, as he will hereafter incur in the
treatment of the injury, together with all the
facts and circumstances in evidence in the case,
and after doing so you will assess the damages at
such sum as from the evidence you may deem proper, not exceeding the amount claimed by plaintiff in his complaint.' "
The court held that there was no substantial difference
between the words ''probable'' and ''reasonably cerSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tain", and cited with approval the law as set down in
8 Ruling Ca.se Laze (~t page 5-1-1, wherein it is stated:

'' ·It is a well-settled general rule that, in assessing the ainount of damages in an action for
a personal injury, the jury 1nay make an allowance for the pain and suffering which the person
injured is reasonably certain to undergo in the
future in consequence of the injury, including
also an allowance for mental suffering. Pain and
suffering which are merely possible and speculative are, of course, not to be considered. All that
is required under this rule is that there be sufficient evidence from which the jury m,ay fairly
deri.ve the conclusio.n :that the chanoes that the
plaimtijf wiU end!ure future :p-ain and sufferitng
preponderate oven- those that he will not. Such
prepondero;nce denotes probabWity or lik,elihood,
a.nd that is sufficient.' "
The same principles as set forth in the foregoing
cases are clearly discus·sed in the following cases: Coppinger et al v. B11oderick et al, (Ariz. Dec. 1931), 295 Pac.
780; GaUamore v. City of Olympia, 34 Wash. 379, 75 P.
978; Harris v. Brown's B1ay Logging Co., 57 Wash. 8,
106 P. 152.
It is clear from the foregoing authorities that the
United States Supreme Court in interpreting the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Utah Supreme
Court have expressly denounced those conservative jurisdictions which have

adopte~

the rule of law that future

pain and suffering must be proved with ''reasonable
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ing when established by a ''preponderance of the evidence" or when "probable" is compensable.
(b) Instruction No. 16 did not in any way prejudice the defendant.
Defendant, in its brief at page 26, states:

'' * * * Not one word in all the evidence at the
trial indicated that Duffy was suffering pain or
that he had been suffering pain from his injuries
for more than one year prior to the trial. Not one
word of testimony indicated that Duffy's bodily
function had been impaired by his injuries or that
it was probable or likely that his bodily function
would be impaired by his injuries, * * * ''
We take serious issue with defendant on this proposition.
Approximately three months proir to his accident
and injuries the plaintiff had undergone a serious major operation for removal of his gall bladder. This had
necessitated the making of an incision approximately 10
inches in length down the center of his stomach and the
retraction of the stomach, dissection and ligation of the
blood vessels in that portion of his anatomy, and after
the operation the sewing up of the various fascia of
the stomach. It was necessary for a drain to be placed
in the wound which remained therein for some time after
the operation. Unless an individual has actually undergone a serious operation of this nature it is .doubtful
whether he would understand or fully appreciate the
amount of mental pain and anguish and worry associated
with such an operation. After plaintiff had discovered
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the incisional hernia and knew that the operation had
to be repeated, that another incision had to be 1nade and
the various fascia or layers of fat, muscles and tissues
of the stomach resewn, the jury, relying upon its own
fund of knowledge and human experience, as it had a
perfect right, and in fact, a duty to do, found the plaintiff underwent extreme mental pain and suffering in anticipation of the operation.
Dr. Rees H. Anderson's testimony will be recalled
wherein he stated that an operation was not immediately
performed upon the plaintiff for reduction of the incisional hernia because ''I don't think that he was particularly prepared to undergo another operation, mentally, at that particular time." (R. 188).
After the second operation was performed there is
no question but that the plaintiff continued to suffer
from mental pain and anguish, worry and consternation
over whether or not this tearing apart in the area of his
previous operation which had occurred once might oecur again. Dr. Rees Anderson testified that "in any hernia the tendency to recur is considerable.'' And again :

'' Q. What, in your opinion, might cause a recurrence in his case~ .
A. I believe the poor tissue, the poor fascia,
the improper healing.'' (R. 194).
This testimony of the doctor establishes that one of the
results of the hernia suffered by plaintiff was that his
body had been so weakened that a tendency toward re-
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currence of that injury. was considerable. This was testimony that a jury could take into consideration, and
determine therer'rom that the effects of the injuries suffered by plaintiff would extend into the future.
In the face of this evidence would this court have
sustained an instruction that there was no evidence of
any future ill effects which could result from the hernia suffered by plaintiff and that therefore the jury
could not consider any future damages from such injury
because plaintiff's body was as good now as it was before the hernia?
The mere statement of this demonstrates that defendant's contentions fly directly in the face not only
of this medical testimony, but also the common experience of mankind. Where once there has been a hernia
the tendency to a recurrence is considerable.
This very tendency to a recurrence also lays the
basis for compensable mental suffering in the future.
From this testimony, and by calling upon their own common experience, a jury could reasonably find that
the plaintiff would in the future experience mental
suffering in the form of worry on his part as he
goes about his daily tasks in fearing that this hernia
may recur. The occupation of the plaintiff is that
of a switchman which requires the throwing of switches,
then climbing on and off cars and other ·physical
activities which distinctly call for physical exertion
which may in the future cause the contemplated
recurrence of the hernia. We submit that this fear of
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injury to a weak body through these f'Xf'rtions will be
present with plaintiff for a considerable time in the
future.
\Ye believe that a jury, viewing the nature of the
two operations that had been performed on the plaintiff could well find that plaintiff would go through life
always guarding against a recurrence of an incisional
hernia. The worry and consternation over this condition could well cause not only mental pain and anguish,
but physical pain and suffering as well.
\Y e believe it is impossible to separate and segregate actual physical pain and anguish from the various
types of mental pain and suffering. It is doubtful if
there is such a thing as mental pain and anguish which
does not carry with it physical discomfort. Many people within our common experience have been hospitalized, subjected to long periods of treatment and care
for their physical condition which has resulted from
mental strain and worry. That these elements of pain
are inseparable and incapable of severance, one from
the other, has been recognized by many courts.
In Merrill v. Los .A.ngeles Gas & Electric Co., 158
Cal. 499, 111 Pac. 534, 540, the court discussed in considerable detail the impossibility as a practical matter
of separating and segregating the various types of pain
and anguish, both mental and physical.
''Upon rna ture consideration of these and
other cases, we express the views : First, that the
grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, and humiliaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion which one suffers by reason of physical injuries are component parts of the 'mental suffering' for which, admittedly, damages may be
awarded. If this be not so, then 'mental suffering'
is a meaningless phrase, and, when the laws say
that recovery may be had for physical pain and
mental suffering, it means only that recovery
may be had for physical pain. Second, we think
that the question is largely of academic, and to a
very trifling extent, of practical, importance,
since always and inevitably and against any instruction which a court may present the jury will
take into consideration these very elements of
mental suffering. Physical pain is a meaningless
phrase if it is sought to dissociate it from mental suffering. Physical pain is but one of many
forms of mental suffering. If the law contemplated an award of damages solely for physical
pain, it is meaningless to say that recovery may
also be had for mental suffering. It is equally
meaningless to say that the mental suffering must
be that occasioned by the physical pain, for then
the latter phrase would alone be sufficient to
convey the full meaning of the law. Therefore,
when the law says that a recovery may be had for
mental suffering, it means a recovery for something more than that form of mental suffering
described as physical pain. What more does it
mean~ To mean anything it must include the
numerous forms and phases which mental suffering may take, which will vary in every case
with the nervous temperament of the individual,
his ability to stand shock, his financial condition in life, whether dependent upon his own
labor or not, the nature of his injuries, whether
permanent or temporary, disfiguring and humiliating, and so through a long category, the enumeration of which it is unnecessary here even to
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atten1pt. \Yorry and anxiety oyer the future of
his fan1ily would be a great elernent of mental
suffering to a n1an dependent upon his own
exertions for his and their support. It would not
constitute any elernent of suffering to a man of
abundant n1eans and "~ealth, identically injured.
~-\.. wmnan's mental suffering ·would be much
increased by knowledge of facial disfigurements
-a man's naturally not so much so. Shall
a jury be not permitted to consider these matters in estimating mental suffering, and is it an
answer to say that they are too remote or 'too
delicate to be weighed by any scales which the
law has yet invented~' They are not remote. They
are direct and consequential. 'They differ in degree with individuals, with their sex, circumstances, and positions in life. But so do men
differ in sensing physical pain; so do they differ
in the mental suffering occasioned by physical
pain alone. No one 'would pretend to say that
the actual physical suffering of a crushed leg
is the same in the case of a sodden, phlegmatic
tramp as it would be with a high-strung, nervous, active man of affairs. Yet the law has
scales by which it measures the compensation for
suffering of this kind, and measures it, of course,
in terms of money. Why should it be supposed
that those scales would break down and prove inadequate when other legitimate elements of mental suffering are cast into their balance~ In truth
the admeasurement of suffering in terms of
money is a most clumsy device; but it is the best
device which the law knows, and it is a device
which the law will employ until some better is
discovered. To forbid the consideration of these
other elements of mental suffering, because the
scales are not sufficiently delicate for their admeasurement,
is equally to condemn the use of
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the scales, in the very cases and for the very purposes now admittedly sanctioned by the law.
"We think, therefore, that Inental worry, distress, grief, mortification, where they are shown
to exist, are properly component elements of that
mental suffering for which the law entitles the
injured party to redress in monetary damages.
''But, as we have said, we think the whole
matter possesses more academic than practical
significance. Conceive the case of a plaintiff before a jury with a face shockingly mutilated and
distorted. He testifies that he endured menta]
suffering caused by his injuries. He is asked of
what the mental suffering consists. He replies,
physical pain, anxiety for fear his injuries may
proves so permanent and disabling as to render
him incapable of supporting his family, grief as he
reviews the whole situation lest his disfigurement
may humiliate him and make him an object of
ridicule to his fellows. At the suggestion of defendant's counsel, the jury is instructed to disregard all the elements of mental suffering excepting that arising solely from the physical pain.
Can the jury do it~ Will the jury do it~ It is mere
self-stultification to believe that it will do other
than to make up its verdict under the rule which,
while not one at law, is one of well-nigh universal
human conduct the rule of, 'Put yourself in his
place.' Each juror will consider how he would
feel under like circumstances, and he will not
narrow his contemplation to the mere matter of
physical suffering under the direction of any
court. So that in fact verdicts always have and
always will be rendered from this point of view."
In Sears, Roebu,ck & Oo. v. Hartley, ( C.C.A. 9, dec.
Apr. 3, 1947), 160 Fed. (2d) 1019, there was evidence of
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two months severe pain suffered by appellee ending
about six months before the trial and evidence of a feeling in his ear like a fly. bothering him up to six weeks
before the trial, and that his wife noticed a big difference in his hearing after the accident. There was also
evidence that the memory of his past pain caused appellee to cry on the witness stand ·while telling his story
to the jury. Appellant cmnplained of a portion of an
instruction to the jury which read as follows:
··Such sum as the jury shall award the
plaintiff by reason of the physical pain, if any,
which he has suffered by reason of his said injuries, if any, or which he is reasonably certain
to suffer in the future therefrom, if any.''
Contention was made that said instruction allowed the
jury to speculate on future pain and suffering when
there was no evidence from which they could find such
pain and suffering to exist. The court, in approving the
instruction, stated:
''The jury well could infer that though
caused by mental anguish at the memory of his
pain and the increased los·s of hearing, the physical act of crying is painful and that it was reasonably certain to occur again in the future. The
physical condition of appellee was evidence before
the jury, not before us. It is not for tlUis court to
replace its inference.s for that of the jury. The latter under the California law, and fundamentally,
is allowed a 'wide latitude' and 'elastic discretion' in its deliberations. Taylor v. Pole, 16 Cal.
2d 668, 672-673, 107 p. 2d 614.''
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Courts have instructed juries to allow compensation for mental pain and suffering, if any, when accompanied by physical injuries even though there is no
direct testimony regarding that element of damage ad~
duced at the trial. In Texas Utilities Co. v. Dear, 64 ~· W.
(2d) 807, 814, the court stated:
"In cases of this character, where it is shown
that illness, nervousness, orr bodily pain has r'esulted from the injuries oomplained, of, mental
suffering will be implied. Turner v. McKinney
(Tex. Civ. App.) 182 S. W. 431; Gulf, C. & S. F.
Ry. Co. v. Levy, 59 Tex. 563, 46 Am. Rep. 278;
Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Smith (Tex. Civ.
App.) 197 S. W. 614, affirmed (Com. App.) 222
S. W. 1099; and this case holds that, where the
complaining party has been crippled or suffered
physical injuries, the jury may take into consideration anxiety and suffering from brooding
over the resulbs of said injuries. The courts have
frequently permitted the recovery of damages
where mental suffering resulted from apprehension as to the complaining party's incapacity to
support himself and his family. Citizens' Ry. Co.
v. Branham ('Tex. Civ. App.) 137 S. W. 403; Ft.
W., etc., Ry. Co. v. Turner (Tex. Civ. App.) 157
S. W. 274; 13 Tex. Jur. 125."

In Goldblatt Bros. Inc. L Parish (Ind.) 33 N. E.
(2d) 835, it appeared that there was no evidence of mental pain and suffering on the part of the infant plaintiff in connection with the loss of an arm. The trial court,
however, instructed the jury on future mental pain and
suffering. The appellate court supported the trial court's
instruction and held that in appropriate cases a jury
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can infer from the very nature of the injury, that there
will be future mental pain and suffering.

Smith v. Boston ct JJ. R. R. (N. H.) 177 Atl. 729,
738. In this case the court holds that mental pain and
suffering based on fear of paralysis, even though said
fear is not based on future probabilities, is nevertheless an element of damage. The court stated:
"The testimony of Miss Smith that by reason of the injuries sustained in the accident she
had a horror that her legs might be paralyzed
was properly received. The fact of a fear so
caused, if found by the jury, would be an element
of damages for their consideration, even though
the fear was mistaken. That the fear regarded a
possibility rather than a probability would not
alter the reality of the mental suffering, unless
the jury found the fear so fantastic as to make
them believe that it was not in fact entertained.

,.

*

*

* *

'' * * * This is the not the case of an opinion that n1iss Smith may suffer paralysis; it involves the statement as matter of fact that she
has been continuously suffering from the fear of
that possibility. If found to exist as the result
of the defendant's fault, such suffering would entitle her to damages, and an instruction to the
jury to disregard the apprehension would have
been error. * * * ''

In the case at bar, the happening of an incisional
hernia after a serious operation and the chance of its
recurrence are facts from which a jury could well draw
the permissible inference that plaintiff would continue
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

70
to worry and remain concerned over whether there would
be a recurrence.
That juries are authorized to draw from their own
experiences in life and from their general knowledge
of human behavior in arriving at their verdicts was
recognized by this Court in Schb(})Ue.r v. McOart'lii!J et al
(Utah) 196 P. ( 2d) 968, 973, where it was stated:

" * * * But after a careful consideration of the
entire record, we have reached the conclusion
that a jury, from the medical testimony taken together with the other evidence in the case, and
particularly the testimony of plaintiff, and viewing it in the light of their knowledge and experience in life, could justifiably have found that
plaintiff suffered a permanent and substantial
impairment of earning capacity. * * * "
In Western & A. R. R. v. Dobbs (Ga.) 137 S. E.
407, 408, the court discussed an instruction which included future pain and suffering as an element of damage, and held that the instruction gave the jury its legal
prerogative of viewing the evidence and allowing for
only the damages legally flowing from the injuries sustained. The court stated:
"In a suit against a railroad company by a
married woman, to recover damages because of
the alleged negligent act of the defendant's flagman, causing her to be injured by coming in contact with a lantern in his hands while she was attempting to board a train of the defendant, a
charge that, if the plaintiff is entitled to recover,
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

71
tained~ and, as an eleinent of rproYery, would be
included pain and suffering which she may have
endured, or n1ay hereafter endure, because of the
alleged injury,' is not an instruction that the
plaintiff would be entitled to recover all the
general and special damages resulting from the
physical or bodily injuries inflicted upon her by
the negligent act of the defendant, but is an instruction to the effect that, if she is entitled to
recover, she is entitled to recover only the damages legally flowing from the injuries sustained,
\YhateYer they might appear to be from the evidence. Nor is the charge subject to the objection
that-

" 'It authorized the jury to award the plaintiff damages on the mere imaginary possibility
that she may or might endure such future pain
and suffering because of the alleged injury, and
further because said instructions failed to require that the jury should determine from the
evidence whether there was or was not reasonable
probability that plaintiff would or would not endure future pain and suffering because of the
alleged injury.'
''The charge is an instruction to the effect
that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover
damages for whatever pain and suffering, whether past or future, it might appear from the evidence she has endured, or may endure in the
future.''
So too in the case at bar. The instruction did not
invite the jury to allow damages that were nonexistent
or that were not demonstrated by the evidence but stated
the law and allowed the jury its prerogative of viewing
all of the evidence and allowing recovery for ''all pain
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and suffering, if an;y, both mental and physical which
he has endured since the time he sustained his injuries
and that he will probably endure in the future."
The jury was at no time invited to allow compensation for nonexistent pain and suffering. The jury
heard all of the evidence and argument of counsel for
both sides based thereon. All legal presumptions favor
the proposition that the jury complied with its oath to
render a true verdict based upon the evidence as well as
the instructions given to the court.
In Wilkerson v. M cOarthy et al, supra, the United
States Supreme Court stated:

'' * * * Courts should not assume that in determining these questions of negligence juries will
fall short of a fair performance of their constitutional function. In rejecting a contention that
juries could be expected to determine certain disputed questions on whim, this Court, speaking
through 1\:fr. Justice Holmes, said: 'But it must
be assumed that the constitutional tribunal does
its duty and finds facts only because they are
proved.' Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 206."
And in Schlatter v. McOMthy et al, 198 P. (2d) 473, 474,
...... Utah ........, this Court said on petition for rehearing:

'' * * * We cannot know, and we are not at liberty to speculate as to what reasoning prompted
the jury to use the base figure of $300 per month
in determining what the award for general damages should be. We most certainly .cannot presume
that the jury ignored completely the extensive
evidence of pain and suffering, and that it made
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an award for loss in earning capaeity far in excess of what the evidence showed the loss in earning capacity to be. TVe m'llst presume, in the absence of any clear showing to the contrary, that
the ju.ry acted in a.ccordamce with its sworn duty,
and that a Sttbstantial portion of the general verdict must be allocated to pain and sufferiJng."
Presumably when the court instructed that the jury
could allow compensation for mental and physical pain,
if any, plaintiff would probably endure in the future, if
there was no evidence from which a jury could infer
that plaintiff would suffer future pain, the jury, in compliance with its oath, would not and did not allow compensation therefor. The instruction as has been pointed
out, correctly states the law applicable to damages in
this case. The jury heard the evidence and is the duly
authorized finder of the fact. If the jury was influenced
by bias and prejudice or was a type of jury that might
conceivably allow damages for nonexistent pain and suffering it seems unreasonable that they would have found
plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence and deducted
$3,500.00 from the verdict.
The trial court who heard all of the evidence, observed the witnesses with respect to their honesty and
candor and observed the conduct of the jury throughout
the trial, determined in overruling defendant's motion
for a new trial that the jury's conduct was above reproach. The trial court, observing Charles Thomas Duffy's general inclination to modesty and underemphasis
rather than overemphasis determined that not only from
his conduct during the trial of the case, but from his
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evidence and that of Dr. Rees Anderson, the verdict
was not so excessive as to indicate passion or prejudice
or any other form of misconduct on the part of the jury
and overruled defendant's motion for a new trial. That
court, having determined that its discretionary power
should not be exercised, defendant now comes before the
appellate court requesting a determination that from the
use of the terms ''future mental and physical pain and
suffering which he will probably endure in the future,
if any," the jury disregarded its oath and took into
consideration so-called nonexistent evidence in rendering
its verdict. We cannot believe that such was the case. If
the jury concluded that plaintiff would not endure
pain and suffering in the future, then the natural presumption is that the jury did not include in its assessment
of damages any sum for future pain and suffering, but
certainly it was proper for the court, in view of the
evidence, to suggest a consideration of these matters.
Under the instruction the court left it entirely to the
jury to determine whether there would be future effects
from the injuries sustained. The jury and the trial judge
were in the best position to evaluate the testimony
of the witnesses as well as the character and type of
individual who is the plaintiff in this action.
It will be observed that in the case at bar the criticized instruction is not an instruction directing the jury
to specifically find damages for plaintiff on account of
future pain and suffering, but merely sets forth the
standards by which the jury should be guided in determining the amount of compensation to which plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tiff was entitled in the event the issues on liability were
determined adversely to the defendant.
A case which holds such an instruction proper is the
case of City of Paducah v. Brunnhoper (1939) 281 Ky.
177, 135 S. "\V. (2d) 413, 417, wherein the court stated:
·· ~l further obj~tion urged is that 'the court
erred in its instruction to the jury to find damages for the plaintiff on account of permanent injuries, there being no definite and positive proof
that she received permanent injuries of any kind.'

''This criticism of the instruction we conceive is also unwarranted, in that no instruction
was given directing the jury to specifically find
damages for plaintiff on account of permanent
injuries, but on the other hand, the court only instructed the jury as to the measure of damages
to be applied in awarding compensatory damages
by its instruction No. 5, wherein the jury was told
that if it found for the plaintiff, it would award
her such sum in damages as it believed from the
evidence would fairly and reasonably compensate
her for physical pain and mental s-qffering, if any
of either, that she had already suffered or which
appeared reasonably certain she would suffer as
the direct and proximate result of her injury, not
exceeding $10,000; and such further sum as it believed from the evidence reasonably represented
tiine lost as the direct and proximate result of
the injury and doctors' bills, not to exceed $100
for each of the last two items.''
Defendant has argued that there is no affirmative
evidence of future pain and suffering in this case. The
jury, however, is allowed great latitude in dra-wing inferSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ences from known facts. It is no answer to say that the
jury's verdict requires some speculation and conjecture.
Tn all doubtful fields of human experience a certain
amount of speculation and conjecture is necessary. Who
can say when a man loses an arm or a leg whether he
will be able to adjust himself to the challenge of life
and become an even more useful citizen, or whether he
will grieve and die~ When a father loses his life who
is to say whether the widow will remarry within a year
or will live out her life span alone and friendless~ Who
is to say whether Charles Thomas Duffy will worry and
suffer in the future from the possibility of a recurrence of the incisional hernia; whether the hernia will
actually recur; or whether he will reach a perfect adjustment following his injury~ The reason for our jury
system and for reliance upon ·a jury of eight impartial
citizens is that the combined human experience of such
individuals has been demonstrated as the most desirable
tribunal to weigh facts against their own life experience
and draw reasonable inferences from known facts.
In a recent United States Supreme Court decision,
Lavender v. Kurn, 66 S. Ct. 740, ________________________________________ ,
the court stated:
"It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict involved speculation and conjectur.e. Whenever facts are in dispute or the evidence is such
that fair-minded men may draw different inferences, a n1easure of speculation and conjecture is
required on the part of those whose duty it is
to settle the dispute by choosing what seems to
them to be the rnost reasonable inference. Only
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u:hen there is a complete abse·uce of prulJllfii'C
facts to support the conclusion reached does a
rerersible error appear. But where, as here, there
is evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the
jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever
facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. And the
appellate court's function is exhausted when the
evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more
reasonable.''

This Court has heretofore given expression to the
right of a jury to call upon its own common experience
in drawing inferences from known facts. See Schlatter
v. McCarthy, et al, supra, where it is stated:

·~

" * * * It should be noted here that plaintiff was
not trained or qualified to engage in any other
gainful oc<?upation. And even if plaintiff were
able to return to railroad work, it is fairly inferable that he would not be able to work so many
hours as before, due to his weakened condition.
It is also inferable that even if plaintiff would
be able to return to his railroad work, that he
would not be able to continue in employment for
as many years as if he had not been injured.''
Another matter which indicates that this instruCtion was not prejudicial is the fact that the verdict returned was not excessive under the evidence and awarded plaintiff only such damages as constitute fair and just
compensation for the injuries suffered by him. This
matter will be discussed in Point V. hereof.
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POINT V.
THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS NOT SO EXCESSIVE AS
TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS DICTATED BY PASSION
OR PREJUDICE.

Charles Thomas Duffy suffered a severe and painful injury as a direct result of defendant's negligent conduct. It will be recalled that after his original operation for removal of the gall bladder he recuperated normally and was discharged from the doctor's care as being in proper condition to return to his employment.
He had undergone an extremely serious operation,
involving retraction of the stomach, removal of the gall
bladder, ligation of the blood vessels and other parts of
the anatomy, and suturing of the several layers of skin,
fat tissue and muscle, lining the abdominal cavity. The
operation necessitated the placing of a drain in the incision.
Approximately three months thereafter, and after
plaintiff had been performing the duties of his employment without incident for some period of time, the incisional hernia was incurred. Plaintiff felt "an awful
sharp pain at the time" and also testified that "it felt
as though water was running out in the vicinity of his
previous operation.'' Th~ury properly found that plaintiff's mental anguish and worry over his condition after having undergone such a serious operation was extensive and extreme in addition to the physical pain and
suffering which he endured. The doctor testified that he
did not advise an operation immediately after the acciSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dent becau~e ''I don't think that he was particularly prepared to undergo another operation, n1entnll:·, at that
particular time" (R. 188). The second operation was
performed involving an incision along side the previous
incision, approxin1ately ten inches in length, necessitating again separating the various layers of skin, fat and
muscle, lining the abdominal wall and resuturing, using
approximately fifty stitches. Apparently the stomach
and the fascia in the upper portion of the abdomen, the
intestines and possibly the colon, had protruded through
the previous incision in the abdon1inal wall. The doctor
testified that heavy straining would cause the abdominal
organs to protrude through the skin portion of the stomach wall resulting in the incisional hernia which plaintiff acquired in manipulating the switch.
Plaintiff was hospitalized for thirteen days following the operation and did not return to work for approximately three months. Following the operation he
complained of pain .which the doctor attributed to the
technical procedure of the operation and the type of suturing that was performed. The doctor testified that
the tendency of this type of hernia to recur is considerable (R. 193) and that the tendency of the hernia to
recur in this case was increased because of the poor
tissue, the poor fascia and possibly improper healing.
The injury which plaintiff sustained necessitated
a very serious major operation. It is within common experience that such operations undermine the general
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health, cause untold mental anguish with attendant physical discomfort and suffering as well. We all know that
worry, anxiety and other forms of mental pain can and
do cause physical symptoms such as high blood pressure
and actual physical discomfort. People are constantly
requiring rest cures and hospitalization brought on by
nervous breakdowns and other forms of worry. The pain
and suffering caused by mental anguish cannot be disassociated from actual physical discomfort.
The jury considering all of these elements could
well have found and did find that Charles Thomas Duffy's physical and mental pain and suffering was v-ery
real and substantial, and that he was entitled to liberal
remuneration therefor. It was stipulated that the lost
wages suffered by Mr. Duffy as a direct result of the
injury was $1300.00. 'The jury found that for his pain
and suffering and loss of bodily function he was reasonably entitled to an additional sum of $11,200.00, and
from the $12,500.00 verdict they deducted $3,500.00 for
contributory negligence.
The trial court, viewing the evidence, hearing the argument of counsel and being fully advised in all particulars, refused to reduce the amount of the verdict or to
grant a new trial.
We have not cited cases illustrating verdicts comparable to the verdict in this case. The facts concerning
plaintiff's injuries are peculiar and must be examined
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on their own merit and as was said in ll/QAfee r. Ogden t'nion Ry. tt Depot Go., (1923) 62 Utah 115, 218 P.
98, 104:
"Yerdicts rendered 10, 15, or 20 years ago
are of little help in determining what amount is
now excessive in a personal injury case. The present cost of living must be considered, ancl the diminished purchasing power of the dollar must be
taken into consideration when estimating damages. In Coke v. Timby, 57 Utah 53, 192 Pac. 624,
it is said:
'' 'A few years ago such a sum might not
have been awarded by a jury, but in this day of
high prices the amount awarded cannot be said
to be excessive.' ''
Whether this court will interfere with a verdict upon the ground of excessiveness has been considered in
many cases and rules have been established for the determination of this question.
In Pauly v. McCartlvy et al, 109 Utah 398, 184 P.
(2d) 123, the court stated:
"Where we can say, as a matter of law, that
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice, and the trial court abused its discretion
or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a
motion for a new trial, we may order the verdict
set aside, and a new trial granted. Jensen v. D.
& R. G. Ry. Co., supra; and other cases cited
above following that decision. But mere excessiveness of a verdict, without more, does not neSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cessarily show that the verdict was arrived at by
passion or prejudice. Stephens Ranch & Livestock
Co. v. U. P. Ry. Co., supra. It is true that the
verdict might be so grossly excessive and disproportionate to the injury that we could say
from that fact alone that as a matter of law the
verdict must have been arrived at by passion or
prejudice. But the facts must be such that the
excess can be determined as a matter of law, or
the verdict must be so excessive as to be shocking
to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the
jury. McAfee v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co.,
supra; Ward v. D. & R. G. W. Ry. Co., supra. This
is not such a case.
''The verdict here was admittedly liberal.
But the mere fact that it was more than another
jury, or more than this court might have given,
or even more than the evidence justified, does not
conclusively show that it was the result of passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the
jury.
"The jury is allowed great latitude in assessing damages for personal injuries. Miller v.
So. Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. 2d 865. The present cost of living and the dilninished purchasing
power of the dollar may be taken into consideration when estimating damages. Coke v. Timby, 57
Utah 53, 192 P. 624; :McAfee v. Ogden Union Ry.
& Depot Co., supra.
''We can discover nothing in this case, except the amount of the verdict, which indicates
passion or prejudice, and, as we have seen, passion and prejudice are not necessarily inferred
from an excessive verdict, without more. :\To exception was taken to the jury or any member
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

83
thereof. No conduct on the part of the jury, evincing passion and prejudice has been ealled to our
attention. The only point of complaint is the size
of verdict."
It is with great reluctance that courts interfere with

the verdicts of juries on the ground that the damages
awarded are excessive. In the Pauly case this Court
pointed out: ''But, although we have the power to order
a new trial in case of an excessive verdict, it is a power
which we have rarely, if ever, exercised." That these
rules are followed by courts in determining whether or
not they should set aside a verdict because of the amount
of damages awarded is understandable when the type
and elements of damages involved in personal injury
cases are considered.
In the case at bar the elements of damage, which
were disputed, were mental and physical pain and suffering and loss of bodily function which plaintiff had
suffered or which plaintiff would probably suffer in the
future, if any. No standard has been or can be devised
for calculation with any degree of exactitude money
damages for these elements of loss. Of necessity the

trl~

bunal required to fix the amount of damages must be

al~

lowed a large degree of discretion in so doing. The jury
is the tribunal empowered to determine and fix damages.
This is especially true under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.
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cessarily show that the verdict was arrived at by
passion or prejudice. Stephens Ranch & Livestock
Co. v. U. P. Ry. Co., supra. It is true that the
verdict might be so grossly excessive and disproportionate to the injury that we could say
from that fact alone that as a matter of law the
verdict must have been arrived at by passion or
prejudice. But the facts must be such that the
excess can be determined as a matter of law, or
the verdict must be so excessive as to be shocking
to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the
jury. McAfee v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co.,
supra; Ward v. D. & R. G. W. Ry. Co., supra. This
is not such a case.
''The verdict here was admittedly liberal.
But the mere fact that it was more than another
jury, or more than this court might have given,
or even more than the evidence justified, does not
conclusively show that it was the result of passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the
jury.
"The jury is allowed great latitude in assessing damages for personal injuries. Miller v.
So. Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. 2d 865. The present cost of living and the diminished purchasing
power of the dollar may be taken into consideration when estimating damages. Coke v. Timby, 57
Utah 53, 192 P. 624; :McAfee v. Ogden Union Ry.
& Depot Co., supra.
''We can discover nothing in this case, except the amount of the verdict, which indicates
passion or prejudice, and, as we have seen, passion and prejudice are not necessarily inferred
from an excessive verdict, without more. No exception was taken to the jury or any member
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

83
thereof. No conduct on the part of the jury, evincing passion and prejudice has been called to our
attention. The only point of complaint is the size
of verdict. ''
It is with great reluctance that courts interfere with

the verdicts of juries on the ground that the damages
awarded are excessive. In the Pauly case this Court
pointed out: ''But, although we have the power to order
a new trial in case of an excessive verdict, it is a power
which 'Ye have rarely, if ever, exercised.'' That these
rules are followed by courts in determining whether or
not they should set aside a verdict because of the amount
of damages awarded is understandable when the type
and elements of damages involved in personal injury
cases are considered.
In the case at bar the elements of damage, which
were disputed, were mental and physical pain and suffering and loss of bodily function which plaintiff had
suffered or which plaintiff would probably suffer in the
future, if any. No standard has been or can be devised
for calculation with any degree of exactitude money
damages for these elements of loss. Of necessity the

tr1~

bunal required to fix the amount of damages must be allowed a large degree of discretion in so doing. The jury
is the tribunal empowered to determine and fix damages.
This is especially true under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.
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The rule to be followed is well stated in 15 .A.m. Jur.
620, Damages, Sec. 204:
''It may be laid down as a general principle
that the determination of the amount of damages
in an action is primarily the province of the jury
under proper instructions by the trial court, and
the courts are generally reluctant to interfere
with their verdict when it is challenged either as
excessive or inadequate, and apart from any objection to the correctness of the instructions given or refused by the court.''
And again in 15 Am. Jur. 621, Sec. 205:
''In actions sounding in damages merely,
where the law furnishes no legal rule for measuring them, the amount to be awarded rests largely in the discretion of the jury, and with their
verdict the courts are reluctant to interfere.''
This Court has stated in Jensen v. D. & R. G. R. Co.,

5M

Utah 100, 138 P. 1185, that although the foregoing

is true, the jury cannot be permitted to go unbridled
and unchecked and that the courts have the power of
supervision under the rules above set forth. The trial
court must exercise a discretionary power over the
amount of the verdict and the rule in this respect is
stated in 15 Am. Jur. 622, Damages, Sec. 205, as follows:
''The question of the excessiveness of a verdict is generally one for the determination of
the trial court in the first instance, and its action in granting or refusing to grant a new trial
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on that ground will not be disturbed on appeal
unless an abuse of discretion is shown.''
The defendants in the case at bar sought to invoke
the exercise of this discretionary power of the trial court.
They made a motion for a new trial and one of the
grounds urged by them was that the verdict of the jury
was excessive, it "appearing to have been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice.'' The trial court
denied the motion for a new trial, thereby placing the
stamp of approval upon the amount of the verdict rendered by the jury. As stated in Stephens Ranch & Live
Stock Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 48 Utah 528, 161 Pac.
459 at 462:

'' * * ':~ Necessarily upon such a question appellate courts must, to a large extent, rely upon
the judgment and discretion of the trial court.
That court is in a much better position to observe
and determine whether a jury was actuated by
passion or prejudice, or by both, in returning a
verdict for an amount larger than the evidence
justifies, or whether the jury was merely mistaken with regard to the amount that should have
been allowed.''
Hence, when defendants come to this Court asserting that the verdict is greater than the evidence justifies they are faced with the burden of convincing, this
Court that the amount of damages so rendered was so
excessive as to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice and that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. Defendants in their brief have not undertaken to discharge
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this duty, but apparently take the position that to set
aside the verdict they need only establish insufficiency
of the evidence to support the amount of the verdict,
when the amount rendered was largely within the discretion of the jury and within the discretion of the trial
court in ruling upon the motion for a new trial.
That defendants' position cannot be sustained on authority is shown by the following language contained in
Stephens Ranch & Live Stock Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co.,
supra:

'' * * * But it does not necessarily follow that
because the jury returns a verdict in which a
greater sum is allowed than is authorized by the
evidence for that reason alone the verdict is the
result of passion or prejudice. If such were the
Tule, all cases in which excessive verdicts are returned would have to be retried.''
Under the foregoing well-established rules we do
not believe that defendants have met the requirements
placed upon them by the law to support a successful
attack of the verdict on the ground that it is larger
than the evidence justifies. This entire matter should be
considered from the same standpoint and in the same
light as the damage verdict was considered in the Pa.t~ly
case and the many cases therein cited from this Court
where this matter has heretofore been given consideration. As stated in Browning v. Bank of Vernal, 60 Utah
197, 207 P. 462, at 464:

" * * * However, the only question for determination by this court is, Can it be determined
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--·

as a n1atter of law, under the cirrumstanres, that
the dan1ages werp so exressiye as to appear to
have been given under the influence of passion
or prejudice~''

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully sub1nitted that all questions pertaining to liability were properly presented to the jury
by the instructions, and that there was a firm evidentiary foundation for the verdict in favor of plaintiff.
The injuries which plaintiff suffered in the course
of his employment through the negligence of the defendant in maintaining the switch, were serious injuries
requiring a major operation. The rupturing of the muscles and fascia of his abdomen weakened his body to the
extent that the chances of a recurrence were in the words
of the doctor "considerable.'' Under all the circumstances presented by the record in this case we submit
that the plaintiff was awarded only just and fair compensation for his injuries.
We therefore respectfully submit that the jury's
verdict should be sustained.

Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK & ROBERTS
WAYNE L. BLACK
Attorneys for Respondent.
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